Explaining the AFL-CIO, Pt. 1

The "House of Labor" matters. But how does it work?

Mention the AFL-CIO in the right labor spaces, and you’ll get interesting reactions.

There’s no shortage of contemporary criticism of the AFL-CIO, with volleys coming from various sides. Many express frustration with the AFL-CIO’s past history as an extension of anticommunist American foreign policy; AFL-CIA is a frequent epithet despite the AFL’s abandonment of their Cold War role. Critics may also point to the present affiliation of unions like the International Union of Police Associations. 

Others have a simple criticism: what does it even do? Sometimes, this is a sincere question by those that truly do not know what the AFL-CIO’s role is; frequently, however, it’s a barbed criticism of the institution’s seeming inertia and institutional conservatism. Even as some affiliated unions embrace a more vibrant, energetic, and even militant moment, the AFL-CIO treads cautiously behind.

Hamilton Nolan is one of the AFL-CIO’s sharpest public critics, and often takes aim at the institutional inertia of the AFL-CIO, and particularly its marginal role in supporting and encouraging organizing unorganized workers. His arguments were distilled in his recent book The Hammer, and are put into useful context by Joseph McCartin for the Los Angeles Review of Books. As McCartin notes, Nolan expresses the same frustration that motivated Andy Stern and Walter Reuther to choose secession over remaining within the federation: the sense that the movement is surging forward, while the AFL-CIO lags behind.¹ It’s the same concern that motivated Sweeney, Trumka, Chavez-Thompson, and the “New Voice” to organize and win the 1995 AFL-CIO election, and create an Organizing Department within the AFL-CIO.²

What’s lacking in many contemporary criticisms, however, is an appreciation or understand of how it works, and thus, the why of it. Institutions operate upon a logic and within a set of power relationships; the AFL-CIO is no different. That lack of knowledge and context is widespread, including within the ranks of dedicated labor activists. Active trade unionists, from shop stewards to local presidents to paid staff, have a superficial at best understanding of the AFL-CIO as an entity; the average unionist knows next to nothing. To the extent they know anything, it may seem to be a distant entity in Washington, abstracted from the day-to-day of their shop floors. Even for people active within the AFL-CIO, how things get done can often appear opaque — a category in which I sometimes find myself.

But how it works matters to understanding how the institution could change, and imagining vast change without establishing a viable path to accomplish it is utopianism. Critique absent understanding the role, structural levers, institutional incentives, and practical ideology of the AFL-CIO is bound to do little more than remain voices shouting in the wilderness.

So let’s fix that. This series, presented here in its first part, aims to establish a basic framework for understanding what the AFL-CIO is, the basic imperatives, incentives, and constraints within which it (and leaders) operate, and how decision-making adjusts to that context. If we understand the terrain in front of us, we can better understand points of leverage to change it for the better. 

To begin, the AFL-CIO operates principally, though not exclusively, informed by a series of underlying structural realities:

• It has a weak federated structure with autonomous, voluntarily affiliated national and international unions.

• This federated structure extends to subsidiary elements of the AFL-CIO, including state and local area councils, as well as industrial departments (such as the Building Trades).

• Contested votes, including for officers, are determined by weighted voting at all levels, meaning larger affiliates hold more hard power to dictate decision-making.

• It has no direct role, and a marginal supporting role, in the two primary functions of affiliates: collective bargaining, and organizing new unions.

• It has little authority or power to influence or direct affiliates, beyond what affiliates accede.

• The AFL-CIO reflects, though is not reducible to, the opinions and interests of affiliated unions, who enjoy power roughly (but not exactly) proportional to their membership and general influence with other affiliates.

• A majority of affiliates will generally opt for narrow institutional self-interest over collective or coalitional interest, outside of areas that clearly impact organized labor as a whole, reflecting a long-standing attitude, often called “sectionalism,” that has historically been endemic to organized labor generally and the pre-merger AFL specifically.

As we’ll see, these realities, when interrogated, help explain the AFL-CIO – and help illustrate a path to make it more central to our more militant moment.

The House of Labor

The AFL-CIO is often called the “house of labor.” If it is, it’s often closer to a model home.

The implication is both institutional stability, and familial relationship – what were often referred to as fraternal relations between labor unions and union members in the early twentieth century. But the quality and nature of familial relations vary; to the extent AFL-CIO affiliates have them, they often more closely resemble the Bluth family than the Brady Bunch. Families come together for Thanksgiving dinners, though some choose to sit them out over disagreements, and some can be relied upon to start a fight at the dinner table. Outside of those moments of familial togetherness, they lead their own lives, maintaining some close relationships while only tending to others at annual functions. 

In that sense, the metaphor is apt. But for the average American, even this role is murky. To the extent Americans are aware of the AFL-CIO, it’s often mistaken – including in the media – for a union. They understand that it has something to do with labor, but are often unclear what, other than a political mobilizing arm in alignment with the Democratic Party’s political coalition, and an occasional voice on pressing matters of government – particularly trade policy.

But regardless of the practical reality of the name, it means something – and signifies a potential we can’t ignore. To realize that, we need to know what it actually is.

Confederated Labor

There’s an answer to what it is, and the answer isn’t “a union.” 

In technical terms, the AFL-CIO is a national “trade union center,” or an umbrella organization to which trade unions – usually within a nation-state – affiliate. Nations like Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Ireland have entities such as the Canadian Labour Congress, the Trades Union Congress, and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions that act as national federations for affiliated unions organized by craft and industry, much like the AFL-CIO.³ Often, national trade union centers have subsidiary bodies that are more localized, such as the Dublin Council of Trade Unions; some of those subsidiary bodies predate the establishment of national entities.

In the case of the AFL-CIO, it’s organized into three main levels: the national federation, the state federation, and the central labor council, with the latter two chartered by the national AFL-CIO. A separate and parallel level of organization, the area labor federation, is a more recent chartered invention without consistent implementation across the United States.⁴ Local umbrella groups that served as the predecessors for Central Labor Councils predated the formation of the AFL in 1886, and for much of the AFL’s early history local labor councils were a more foundational hub of union activity than the national federation, and were often key parts of the more frequent multi-union mass strike actions prior to the passage of Taft-Hartley in 1947.

Those subsidiaries of the national federation operate under documents collectively referred to as the “Rules Governing,” which lay out the parameters of subsidiary power and their relationship to the national federation. Three key elements include sharp restrictions on involvement in collective bargaining and strikes, a prohibition against taking positions contrary to the policy of the higher appropriate federated body, and a prohibition against independent endorsements for offices normally endorsed by the state and/or national federation. 

Although establishing a national count of subsidiary bodies is difficult, the number is certainly in the hundreds, all with varying levels of geographic spread, affiliated membership levels, and activity. Where they operate well – such as the Philadelphia Labor Council, the Los Angeles Federation of Labor, or MLK Labor in Seattle – labor councils can play a crucial and far more direct role within some of the core priorities of affiliates.

Bargaining & Organizing

So what does a national trade union center, such as the AFL-CIO, actually do?

In nations like the United States with largely enterprise-based bargaining – in other words, where negotiations occur at the level of an employer rather than at a sectoral or national level – national trade union centers are largely uninvolved in collective bargaining for practical and legal reasons, aside from providing support to affiliate members. Enterprise-based bargaining is the primary mode of bargaining in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Ireland (since the end of “social partnership agreements” as a form of national bargaining). In the United States, collective bargaining agreements often apply to individual worksites or facilities of an employer, rather than the employer writ large. Under this model, trade union centers play little role in one of the primary functions of affiliate unions: collective bargaining.

However, that’s not the case everywhere. In France, five major national trade union centers, such as the Confédération Générale du Travail, are recognized as bargaining agents by the French government and are participants within the sectoral bargaining process. This sharply differing role helps explain, in part, the larger role of umbrella groups in calling for large-scale strike action, which has often characterized French and Italian industrial relations – two outliers in both militancy and scope of power.⁵ In contrast, the AFL-CIO is prohibited from setting strike dates or determining authorization for strikes on behalf of affiliates.

Aside from collective bargaining, one of the most primary functions of unions is organizing. In the United States, the AFL-CIO has historically played a less central role in organizing for one crucial reason: it’s not a union, and doesn’t represent workers. The AFL-CIO has played a role in training organizers through the Organizing Institute, in supporting affiliate campaigns, and in connecting workers seeking to organize with affiliate unions, sometimes referred to as “lead generation” by organizers.  However, any organizing needs an affiliated union to represent the workers.⁶

This raises a crucial reason for the AFL-CIO’s limited role in organizing: the thorny political question of “who gets the bird?” Jurisdictions are often murky, and absent exclusive jurisdiction, the AFL-CIO is restricted to determine proper jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. Who gets the lead, and the support? Who does the AFL-CIO risk alienating by choosing? How do they allocate resources, and which affiliates may feel snubbed? Given the potentially thorny questions between affiliates in new organizing, the AFL-CIO has a difficult time carving out an additional role other than acting in support of affiliate campaigns, making the locus of organizing activity the affiliate rather than the national federation. Despite recent noises about playing a greater role, it remains to be seen what the new “Center for Transformational Organizing” accomplishes, though the AFL-CIO’s goal to organize a million workers by the end of the decade drew widespread criticism from affiliates.

Absent a direct role in collective bargaining and industrial relations, or in organizing workers, trade union centers occupy an odd position, serving primarily as a coordinating and support body, as well as a political advocate, for affiliated trade unions. They also mediate inter-union disputes and jurisdictional disputes, including adjudicating claims of “raiding” or “poaching.” Historically, internally policing the movement has been a key role for trade union centers, with mixed success. In the AFL-CIO’s case, it also maintains industrial departments that allow unions with similar memberships to collaborate more closely and present a united front. The most successful is the Building Trades Department, often simply referred to as “the Trades” or “the Building Trades.”

One crucial exception exists: the local level. The national AFL-CIO is too far abstracted from localized bargaining and organizing, but local subsidiaries can often play a more direct supportive role. Some, such as Philadelphia Labor Council, have provided direct organizing support for affiliates engaged in contract campaigns; recently, it ran a “Strike School” for affiliate members seeking to learn more about how to build a successful strike.

In summation: in nations without sectoral bargaining in which they play a role, national trade union centers function as coordinating bodies for legislative and political action, supporting entities providing research and analysis, and a mechanism for settling jurisdictional disputes between affiliated unions. However, this leaves the national AFL-CIO largely tangential to the two major functions of labor unions: collective bargaining, and organizing.

Conclusion

The answer to “what is the AFL-CIO, and what does it do” can provide more questions than answers.

As a trade union center, it operates similarly to federated structures across the globe. But in the case of the United States, the AFL-CIO is largely tangential to the two primary tasks facing affiliate unions: bargaining contracts, and organizing new unions. Despite a historic role in the latter, practical realities prevent an easy resurrection of a direct role in union organizing.

But one crucial conceptual shift – and one to which I’ll return – is to think of the AFL-CIO less as an institution, and more as a space.

There are few if any places in which organized labor comes to the same table, and none with more potential than the AFL-CIO. For those invested in a wider view of labor’s role and of the importance of working class power and politics, this political space is crucial. Unions play a role in constituting working class identity and politics – what people like E.P. Thompson referred to as the working class “for itself,” rather than the mere existence of a working class “in of itself.” 

But doing that requires breaking from narrow self-interest – the necessity of delivering for the interests of your own members, replicating the narrow self-interest of the individual worker that says they don’t need a union. It requires connecting your interests to a broader collective interest, turning self-interest into class interest: a thing that can only credibly occur when unions are brought together.

As I’ll return to in later parts, the AFL-CIO approaches this role – to the extent it approaches it at all – cautiously, in part because of the power relationships and incentives within which it operates. But if we dig deeper, we can see how the terrain can be shifted to bring collective interest to the forefront.

In part two, however, we’ll dig deeper into the powerful structural and political incentives that push the AFL-CIO to cautious moderation – and how those structural and political incentives outweigh the good will and intent of individual committed labor leaders.

1. It’s hardly a shock that Stern and Reuther, possessed of expansive visions and enjoying highly centralized (even autocratic) control over their unions, would find frustration with the far less amenable structure of the federation. Going back further, John L. Lewis – possessed of the same combination of vision and autocratic impulse that characterized Stern and Reuther – was instrumental in establishing the CIO after failing to change AFL policy internally. Unlike Stern and Reuther’s later secessions, the CIO fundamentally changed organized labor, albeit without the institutional ability to survive outside of the AFL for the long term. 

2. Concern over organizing predated their election, and began even under Kirkland/Donahue. The first internal AFL-CIO discussions about organizing began in the first Reagan term, and the Organizing Institute was established in 1989, with Richard Bensinger – who recently helped build the Starbucks Workers United campaign – as the head. The reality faced by Sweeney, Trumka, and Chavez-Thompson was that there was, as detailed by Richard Hurd, no present culture of AFL-CIO leadership in organizing, despite examples of AFL support prior to the 1955 merger. Sweeney’s call for budget prioritization of new organizing – a call echoed by Nolan and other activists – raised consternation among many AFL-CIO affiliate leaders, leading directly to the New Unity Partnership and the Change to Win split. As part of that call, Sweeney urged a target of organizing a million workers per year; affiliates did not take it seriously, and the AFL-CIO had no ability to require it.

3. The AFL-CIO is not the only trade union center within the United States. The “Strategic Organizing Center,” once the “Change to Win Federation,” was founded in the 2005 split led by SEIU and other unions. It still technically functions as a trade union center, and focuses heavily on providing research support to affiliated unions including SEIU, CWA, and UFW; it has also played a supportive role in organizing and advocacy campaigns such as Starbucks Workers United and the Fight for $15. Although CWA also maintains membership in the AFL-CIO, SEIU and UFW do not.

4. The Area labor federation, or “ALF,” was an outgrowth of the “New Alliance” initiative in the early 2000s. ALFs, which cover a geographic jurisdiction comprising numerous subsidiary Central Labor Councils (sometimes reorganized as chapters), were intended to provide coordination and administrative support for Central Labor Councils often unable to maintain basic administrative operations independently. However, the implementation of ALFs varied widely from state to state. In New York, ALFs operate largely as intended; by many accounts they do so effectively. In some states, such as Massachusetts, some CLCs have reorganized as chapters of a larger ALF – such as Western Massachusetts – rather than independent chartered entities, making the ALF the most local chartered body of the AFL-CIO. In Pennsylvania, there is no consistent model, and ALFs often operate as additional layers of bureaucracy layered on Central Labor Councils.

5. In France and Italy, collective bargaining covers 98% and 100% of workers, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, far outstripping Germany and Nordic nations. In contrast, slightly over 10% of American workers are covered by collective bargaining agreements. However, one unique facet of French and Italian industrial relations is that membership within a union is far lower than coverage; in the United States there is usually only a 1% or less variation between the two. While 98% of French workers are covered by union agreements, rates of membership are far lower, with approximately 10% of French workers belonging to unions – analogous to the United States. Belonging to the union reflects a deliberate political choice, making membership far more active as a whole than among American union members.

6. Dorothy Sue Cobble, in an argument first written in 1997 and echoed by Hamilton Nolan, raises the prospect of reviving the “DALU,” or “directly affiliated local union,” sometimes called a “federal labor union.” Before the AFL-CIO merger, the AFL chartered thousands of DALUs, some of which folded, some of which merged into other unions, and some of which persisted for some time. Six DALUs remain affiliated to the AFL-CIO. AFL organizers played a direct role in organizing DALUs, though the success of the program is hard to definitively establish. It’s a compelling idea, in part because it sidesteps the willingness of individual affiliates to engage in organizing and provides a direct role for the AFL-CIO.

However, despite this historic role, playing out the revival of such a program in a modern climate shows that it’s politically untenable, and potentially unnecessary. Politically, affiliates would revolt over the AFL-CIO chartering its own independent local unions instead of providing leads to affiliates. Many would credibly argue that their per capita payments are funding the AFL-CIO to encroach on their jurisdictions, and they would be well aware that in this context, such a program would be enacted as an end-run around them. As far as necessity, DALUs were an alternative to chartering new unions in sectors without existing unions, in an era in which craft and industrial jurisdictions were narrowly cut. In the modern era of nearly meaningless jurisdictional boundaries, unions represent workers across a full spectrum of sectors, making DALUs unnecessary except as an end-run around uncooperative affiliates.